Daf Yomi, Marriage Counseling, Psychotherapy, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Torah and Psychology
Our Gemara on Amud Aleph raises a theoretical question that at first glance has no practical implication. According to the opinion that in the wilderness the Jews did not need to do shechitta, but rather meat was permitted by stabbing the neck of the animal, what would be the status of such meat upon entry into the land of Israel? The core question is: do we follow the moment of slaughter, or where the meat is right now, which is a place where it would be forbidden without proper shechitta?
Rashi here notes that there is no practical implication because this was a one-time event in history that such meat was permitted, and it would not recur again. However, Rashi says this is the principle of derosh ve-kabel sachar, which literally translates as “investigate and derive, and receive the reward.” Rashi explains that there is a purpose in understanding the truths of the Torah even if there is no legal or practical outcome.
The Rosh here quotes Rashi and objects. He says this principle of derosh etc. is employed only when it comes to trying to understand the text of the scripture. But when trying to understand a legal case, there must be an actual practical outcome. Therefore the Rosh suggests that there is a practical outcome as applied to a case where somebody makes an oath to not eat a particular kind of food commencing a period of time. If he already prepared the food and then that time came upon him, would this oath be relevant to that food, or only to new food subsequent to the commencement of this period of time?
Let us try to understand the differences between Rashi and the Rosh’s approach. It seems that the Rosh holds that it is one thing to try to understand the text of the scripture, even if there is no practical implication. The scripture is inherently holy and divine and it is something that we want to understand and appreciate regardless of any possible practical outcome. On the other hand, to imagine various legal scenarios that employ principles of the Torah, but have no particular practical outcome does not seem worthy.
On the other hand, Rashi has two powerful arguments. This is not simply hypothetical, even if there is no practical outcome, because we are using a hypothetical case to understand a dimension of an actual Torah law. In other words, we are trying to understand the boundaries of the permissibility of stabbing the animal in the neck for the generation of the wilderness and when the obligation of Shechitta commenced. The laws of shechitta, while not part of the written Torah, should be no less significant, and trying to understand their boundaries and meaning, even if there is no practical implication, should be no different than trying to understand the text. Why is the Oral Torah less important? Furthermore, the Rosh’s answer is problematic. Are we really to believe that oaths which follow human intention and context should be dictated by a legalism? Generally speaking, regarding oaths, the sages follow human intention (see Nedarim 49a.)
To resolve this, I suggest that actually, without realizing it, the Rosh and Rashi are not arguing. The Rosh took Rashi literally and objected because he could not see a value in investigating Torah hypotheticals without practical significance. The Rosh then suggested a practical significance in regard to an oath as described. I think the Rosh was well aware that ultimately, when it comes to oaths, we follow human intention, but in fact it was a subject of debate in Gemara Nedarim (ibid).
What then did the Rosh mean? He meant to say that by studying the boundaries and limitations of the generation of the wilderness in relation to the inception of the obligation to slaughter, it gives us an insight into Torah thinking about how to relate to boundaries in prohibitions and when they begin.
That is to say, it is not that there has to be a practical implication, but rather the potential for a practical implication shows that there is a deeper truth that is important to discover and valuable. In that sense, I think Rashi and Rosh do not disagree and they were using different terms to describe the same idea.
Therefore, the Rosh meant to say that since understanding this idea could possibly influence how we look at an oath, it offers dimensions of inquiry that could have possible implications. The idea that it can have an implication in some future Halacha makes the inquiry valid and not merely hypothetical. It is valid because it teaches some truth regarding a principle or aspect within the Halacha. The potential practical application is a litmus test that there is some important truth to be discovered. So it is not that the case of oaths requires a final proof; it is more that the idea of intention and boundaries of intention are a valid intrinsic truth to investigate and could be helpful and a discussion regarding the limits of oaths as an example. .
When we look at it in this light, the Rosh and Rashi are not arguing. Both would agree that hypotheticals with no significance have no value. Both would agree that delving into the scripture to understand the meaning of the text, even if there is no practical outcome, has intrinsic value. And, finally, both would agree that investigating the boundaries of various halachic principles is valid because they might have implications and applications, which are determined through analysis and trying to understand the truth of the Torah for its own sake.
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Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation
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Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, LCSW-R, LMFT, DHL is a psychotherapist who works with high conflict couples and families. He can be reached via email at simchafeuerman@gmail.com