Our Gemara on Amud Aleph relates an interlude in which an angel rebuked Rav Ketina for wearing a garment that was exempt from tzitzis. Rav Ketina asked why he should be liable: the garment was of an exempt nature, and at worst he merely neglected an opportunity to fulfill a positive commandment. The angel responded that at a time of divine wrath (perhaps when a person is in imminent danger or in a dangerous situation), one can still be liable. This might be because he does not have enough merit for miraculous intervention and salvation.

Tosafos adds an important proviso. If the mitzvah is a standing obligation and one neglects it, he is definitely liable for punishment. Only regarding a mitzvah that is fulfilled upon acting—but is not a standing obligation—can one claim that there ought not be punishment. Rav Ketina’s garment was not obligated in tzitzis; the angel’s objection was that in a time of divine wrath, Rav Ketina needed a merit to protect him and should have sought out a garment in order to fulfill the mitzvah.

Sefer Daf al Daf brings a Penei Yehoshua (Shabbos 55a), who raises a question as to why the angels seem to suddenly (at dawn; see Bereishis 19:15) switch roles—from behaving mercifully to rushing Lot out of Sodom because he was in danger of being swept up in the punishment of the community. Penei Yehoshua answers that Lot could have been held liable for not objecting to and rebuking his fellow countrymen of Sodom, but this was akin to a positive commandment, so he was not liable. However, the Gemara states that dawn is a time of divine wrath (Berachos 7a), and so Lot was suddenly liable, like Rav Ketina, and the angels had to rush him out.

The Pri Megadim (Tevas Gomeh, Vayera) asks: according to Tosafos, one is liable for neglecting a standing positive obligation, and the mitzvah to rebuke is a constant mitzvah—so Lot should have been liable even before dawn. The Kli Chemdah answers that since Lot lived prior to the acceptance of the Torah, the mitzvah of rebuke was not a standing obligation.

Tx

We must ask ourselves: how could such a brilliant mind as the Pri Megadim miss this point? Rather, we must say that there is a deeper dispute about the nature and reason for Tosafos’ proviso. The Kli Chemdah understood it at face value—that it is more serious to neglect an active obligation than to avoid being in a situation where the obligation would apply. However, I believe the Pri Megadim held that the obligation is not the cause of the severity, but rather an indicator of the severity (known in lomdus as the famous siman or sibah chakira). The Pri Megadim held that the fact that it is coded in the Torah as a standing obligation demonstrates its severity. Because of that severity, there is liability for neglecting to fulfill it. Now we can understand the Pri Megadim’s objection: Lot should have been liable for punishment for negating the mitzvah of rebuke because of its intrinsically severe nature, regardless of his particular formal status of obligation.